

THE FOOD SHORTAGE AND JAVANESE SOCIETY FROM THE END OF 1910s TO 1920

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Preface

Since the end of the 19th century Indonesia needed to import large amount of rice [see table 1] because of its shortage resulting from the rapid colonial exploitation which reorganized Indonesia to the country of producing tropical specialities and also because of the limited possibility of opening new rice fields in spite of the continuous population growth in the country [see table 2]. In this way the food situation in Indonesia became more influenced by the rice import than its domestic production.

Under these circumstances Indonesia experienced food crisis several times, and one of the most serious ones was that which occurred from the end of World War I to 1920. In this report we will at first see, focusing on Java and Madura, the food situation in this period in detail, and secondly examine how the Dutch Colonial Government coped with it. And finally we will consider the meaning of their measures viewed from the Javanese society at that time.

Occurrence of the food shortage and the Government measures

1. Occurrence of the food shortage

As the food situation in Indonesia was basically determined by the rice import in the period, we begin with its amount in the normal years. In the years in 1910s before the food crisis discussed in this report, Indonesia imported 400 - 750 tons from 3 regions of the mainland in Southeast Asia (see table 3). In Java and Madura, imported rice occupied about 10% of the total consumption at the time judging from table 4. Smits estimated that on average about 10 kg imported rice was consumed per head [Smits 1919:32]. In the Outer Islands, imported rice was more important than in Java and Madura. Except for the West Coast of Sumatra and Bali and Lombok where the surplus could be exported, rice production was generally insufficient and so import per head was larger in almost all regions than in Java and Madura. This figure was especially high in East Sumatra, Bangka and

Belitung (see table 5). Among others, in East Sumatra, which was the largest plantation area of the Outer Islands, its rice production filled only 1/4 of its demand and a large amount should be imported every year in spite of its small population amounting only to about one million at the end of 1910s. The reason of this we can find in the fact that there were many plantation laborers who did not produce any food, and also in the fact that the people there tended to cultivate commercial crops like rubber or palm rather than food crops.

Under these circumstances the rice import in Indonesia fell to the level of 200,000 tons in 1919 and 1920 because of the following reasons.

It is in the latter half of 1917 that the difficulties began to appear in the rice import, when "as a result of various causes, a gradually decreasing import of the people's main food, rice, was observed here." [MAB 1919:45] According to the "Report of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture in Netherlands India" the "various causes" were the following three: (1) the worsened fiscal situation in most of the Chinese firms due to their excessive speculation, (2) the ban on Rangoon rice export to Indonesia since 19 October which was not withdrawn even at the end of December, and (3) the barrier which the Strait Settlements Government put in the rice export and the consequent ban on the export to Indonesia from Singapore since 2 November. [VHNL 1917:165; 1918:136]

Among them, Indonesia was seriously influenced by (2) and (3), which were the result of the fact that "a great many steamers otherwise care for the rice transport between Rangoon/Netherlands India/Straits harbours, Bangkok/Straits harbours and Saigon/Straits harbours were taken over by the English Government" [VHNL 1918:137].

As a result Rangoon rice contracted to be exported from October to December was not shipped, which caused the sudden rise of rice price in Java where wholesale traders had only 4,000 tons of rice in stock at the beginning of November, immediately before a between-crop season. In the same month, the Dutch Colonial Government sent Van der Linde, administrator of K.P.M., to Rangoon for negotiating on the reopening of export, with the result that in December the agreement was made between the Netherlands Steamnavigation Co. and the English India Government, that permitted the export of 400,000 tons Rangoon rice to Indonesia, a half of which directly and the other half via Singapore under the condition that this company would transport a given amount of coal and rice among various Indian ports. However, this agreement came into effect only in the next March when a part of Dutch vessels were seized, therefore the actual transport amounted only to several thousand tons of rice [VHNL 1918:138; MAB 1919:45]. The Colonial Government, aiming to supplement the shortage of Rangoon rice, also tried to increase its import from Saigon, and many

transactions were made especially in October which brought 46.000 tons to Indonesia [VHNL 1917:166].

The situation in 1918 was, however, not improved. At the beginning of January transactions with Singapore practically stopped due to the blockade of telegraphic communication [VHNL 1918:136]. Furthermore, since March the above mentioned seizure of Dutch vessels made the rice shipping practically impossible for several months [MAB 1919:49; EB:xxxi]. And in the latter half of the year new difficulties arose, that is, bad harvest in the various Asian rice-producing countries. In August there came the news informing the unfavourable expectation of harvest in North India and Bengal, and in the latter half of September Saigon informed that "the 'voorooogst' was seriously damaged because of drought." As a result Rangoon, which had reopened its export since the first half of the year, proclaimed at the beginning of October that its further export to Indonesia could not be admitted and at the same time prohibited the export to the Strait Settlements and Federated Malay States. Also the negotiations with Saigon and Bangkok had a hard going. In this way Indonesia could buy only from Bangkok at the latter half of December. On the other hand, Strait Settlements Government banned the export of Saigon rice at the end of December by reason of decreasing stocks and also put the export of Rangoon rice under its control due to the insufficient supply and upswing in price, with the result that its rice export to Indonesia was limited only to 20.000 sacks a week [VHNL 1918:139~143].

In 1919 the situation worsened more because, adding to the bad harvest in India and Indo-China, Europe needed much rice for the people's food in the period of recovery from the damages of war. As a result Rangoon did not admit rice export to Indonesia throughout the year. Incidentally the total export of Rangoon rice in this year amounted to 1,968,510 tons, of which 1,618,543 tons (82.2%) was exported to India, 164,519 tons (8.4%) to Europe and 185,448 tons (9.4%) to East Asia (Strait Settlements, etc.). Bad harvest in Burma due to the long drought in November also contributed to the continuation of export ban, since Burma, in spite of the favourable expectation in September, had only 700,000 tons of rice for export. It was 800,000 tons less than that of a normal year, at the end of 1919.

Meanwhile, the export amount of Saigon rice harvested in 1918/19 season was estimated to be 800,000 tons, slightly more than half of the normal year, but the actual export was far below and amounted only to 500,000 tons. Moreover, a considerable portion of it was retained by the French Government for the food supply in Germany and Austria. Thus rice export had been almost prohibited since about July. As the harvest in 1919/20 season was anticipated good in October, the reopening of the export was expected, but the export ban continued to the end of the year because of a sudden rise of the currency there [VHNL 1919:186~187].

Under these circumstances, it was only on Siam and Singapore that Java and the Outer Islands could rely respectively for their rice supply in the first half of the year. However, Siam's allowable export, which was estimated at one million tons at the beginning of the year, decreased gradually, and because of the sudden increase in its actual export Siam proclaimed ban since 13 July. This ban was to be lifted at the end of the year, but it was not realized because its harvest in the 1919/20 season was expected to be, due to the drought in October, only about 30% of the normal year, that is, to be the worst harvest in the previous 40 years. Also Singapore had banned private rice trade wholly since 1 June and put it under government control [VHNL 1919:186 - 187; Sekretaris Rubberplanter 1919:291; MAB 1920:117 - 118].

Further, severe drought in Java in October and November, which delayed rice harvest about one month, and the prevailing influenza which victimized 2 millions of lives, worsened the food situation in 1919 still more.

Thus it was only on Saigon that Indonesia could rely at the beginning of 1920. Later Indonesia could import 25,000 tons of Rangoon rice in the first half of the year through the mediation of the Rangoon Government, but Siam admitted to export only a small amount of broken rice (*menir*) in December [VHNL 1920:168].

In this way, further rice import in Indonesia had become gradually difficult since the latter half of 1917 and showed a marked decrease in 1919 and 1920. Thus the food situation in Indonesia became critical and the Colonial Government had to take steps to overcome it.

2. Measures taken by the Dutch Colonial Government

In this period various measures were taken by the Colonial Government, which we can device roughly into two: (a) those to increase the food production along with the consumption saving and, (b) those to control its flow. And in order to execute these effectively such organizations as Rice Commission (in 1917), Regional Advisory Commission for the General Food Problems (in 1918), Local Food Commission and Central Advisory Commission for Food Supply (in 1919) were established.

The Colonial Government started with (a) and had strongly encouraged the expansion of food crops cultivation since 1917 [EB:xxx], and saving of rice consumption and turning to eating other food were also promoted. They also improved irrigation, and restricted the cultivation of commercial crops. These measures are examined in the next chapter. (b) contain the followings: (b-1) the control of the trade of rice, etc.; (b-2) the restriction of the inter regional rice trade in Java.; (b-3) the purchase of domestic rice.; (b-4) food sale by the Government. Among them, (b-3) and (b-4) will be mentioned in detail respectively in chapter 4

and in chapter 3, so here we refer to (b-1) and (b-2) briefly. First the ban on rice export from Java, which was already ordered in 1914, continued until 4 June 1921, when it was cancelled with the Government Decree No.1 (Stbl.no.345). Maize export from Indonesia was also prohibited in 1918 [MAB 1921:51].

The most significant feature of the control of food trade was, however, to restrict private rice import. The Colonial Government had introduced license system since 23 April 1918 into the regions except for the East Coast of Sumatera, Riau and its dependency and Jambi, which in fact made the free trade impossible. It was the aim of this measure that the Government "can supervise the rice import completely and if necessary give guidance to it." [MAB 1919:46] And as a result it was said that the imported rice could be devised smoothly among each region [VHNL 1918:139]. Since 17 February 1919 Jambi (by the Stbl.no.82) and since 26 June of the same year also the East Coast of Sumatera (Stbl.no.305) became included in the restricted regions and this system continued until 15 April 1921, when rice trade reopened to private merchants [VHNL 1921:151]. Thus foreign rice import was wholly in the hand of Central Distribution Bureau (*Centrale Distributie*) in this period.

On the other hand restriction on the inter-regional rice trade in Java was introduced in 1918 and continued until the beginning of 1921, aiming to check the sudden rise of rice price by the speculative trade through prohibiting this kind of trade without the admission of residents [MAB 1919:47; 1921:54].

Measures for increasing the food production and saving the rice consumption

1. Encouragement of food production

It is in October 1917 that the Colonial Government first ordered to take measures for increasing the food production, when the insufficiency of rice transport in the last quarter of this year was clearly expected. Thus regional administrative chiefs were instructed to supervise the fair division of irrigation water, to encourage secondary crops cultivation, food crop planting in the yard and cultivation of dry land rice and maize in the suitable fields, by using, if necessary, the reserved lands for the recovery of forests for this purpose under given conditions, to buy up and distribute rice seed and young rice plant to the districts in short of them and to hire the suitable lands for this purpose. Also the administrative chiefs in Outer Islands were directed to encourage the expansion of rice and other crops cultivation and to consult with the European agricultural enterprises on the measures for increasing rice production [MAB 1919:48].

In November 1918, when the damage of drought was serious in Java and Madura, the program of "Emergency Fund for the Food Production Increase", in which General People's Credit Bank (*Algemeen Volkscrediet Bank*) awarded loans

preferentially to those who employ wage labourers for the food crop cultivation which would be harvested during the between-crop months of from February to April, was proposed and was to be excuted. This program was to be excuted also in the next year [Hoekman 1918 no.11399/A; Boeke 1918].

From the latter half of March to April 1919 Director of the Department of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce (hereafter abbreviated to Dept. of A.I.C.) visited various regions in Java and Madura and consulted with the administrative chiefs or regional food commissions on the subject of the increase of food production. On these occasions such points as the construction and maintenance of roads for food transport and improvement of water supply and drainage in the arable lands through constructing small scale irrigation works were discussed and these were to be excuted [MAB 1920:116~117]. Further in this year "Regulation of the Forced Cultivation" was promulgated with the Government Decree on 19 June (Stbl.no.287), which authorized regional administrative chiefs to order food crop planting in the suitable field which was not under cultivation for a long period.

2. Restriction of the cultivation of export crops

In this period the cultivation of export crops was restricted, which was, however, also a result of decreased export due to the shortage of bottoms. In Java and Madura the main targets of this were the estate sugar cane and the people's tobacco.

As for the former, at first "fallow hiring (*braakhuur*)" was limited since the beginning of 1918 and prohibited by the Order of Governor General no.26 dated 25 November of the same year (Stbl.no.79) unless it had the admission letter of the regional administrative chiefs.

Secondly the Colonial Government announced the plan to cut down its cultivation in the 1918/19 season uniformly by 20 or 25%, which caused fierce dispute between the General Syndicate of Sugar Producers (*Algemeen Syndicaat van Suikerproducenten*) and the nationalists with the result that the reduction was not realized in this year. In December, however, the Government again proposed a new plan of 25% reduction for the 1919/20 season, but because of the hard objections from the side of planters and also because of arising such favorable condition for the food supply as "the harvest of secondary crops, especially that of maize is abnormally well and that of rice is expected to be in the normal year level" in 1919, they finally determined not to excute this plan on 10 May 1920 [GG 1919 no.41a/4x].

In contrast to the incomplete control over the sugar estates, the Government strongly urged the people to cut down their cultivation of commercial crops, which was typically seen in case of tobacco.

People's tobacco in Java, which was roughly divided into the kerf-tobacco produced mainly in Central Java for the domestic markets and the krossok-tobacco mainly in East Java for export to Europe via the hand of European tobacco estates or buyers, greatly expanded due to the high price in the European markets from 1915 to the first half of 1916, and the harvested area reached to 200.000 bouws in 1915 and 230.000 bouws in 1916 [Nota beperking 1918]. However, the gradual shortage of bottoms since about 1916 and the import restrictions in Germany and United Kingdom made its export difficult, resulting in the large accumulation of unsold cargoes at the beginning of 1917 [VHNL 1916:113 - 114, 119; 1917:119]. So the Government, accepting the advices of Agricultural Advisers in various regions, directed residents in the tobacco areas to decrease these cultivations and to promote turning to other crops as far as possible [GS 1917:no.37x]. Further in January 1918, when as a result of accumulating of the 570.000 packages unsold tobacco of 1916 season and 400 thousands bags (*balen*) of 1917 there was little possibility of loading with the 1918's tobacco because shipping companies would prefer to transport the former at first, it was instructed that "the Governor General hoped to acquaint the people in the export tobacco areas with the present situation once again as soon as possible. And, if necessary, people should be persuaded not to plant more "voorooogst" tobacco or dry lands tobacco during the west monsoon of 1917 - 1918 than in the previous year [GS 1918 no.2x]".

Thus until then restrictions on the people's tobacco were directed mainly in connection with the difficulties in the export. It is in the circular letter of Governor General to the residents no.232x dated 26 April 1918 that for the first time the restrictions were considered in the context of the food problems, aiming at appropriating the land formerly occupied by tobacco for planting food crops like maize [Nota beperking 1918]. After that this viewpoint became more emphasized, relating perhaps to the fact that since about August 1918 the growing demand for Java krosok, in connection with the higher price in its main export market, Netherlands, because of the shortage of raw tobacco, raised its price [VHNL 1918:103~105] and this high price was basically maintained during 1919 [VHNL 1919:134; KV 1920:260~261]. For example a memorandum dated 12 December over the restriction of people's tobacco said as follows.

"As the Krossok market has now a favourable picture, we should expect great expansion of its planting in 1919 in such districts as Besuki, Pasuruan, Kediri, Rembang, Kedu, etc. where people have cultivated export tobacco in large scale, unless some restrictive measures are taken by the Government.

In such a case food crop cultivation is to be deprived of the large area of land fitted especially to maize. And as the people have to take special care for the tobacco cultivation, food crops in the same districts will be planted only with

insufficient care. Thus food production increase will meet with a considerable difficulty in such places. [Nota beperking 1918]. "Thus, notwithstanding that the Government considered that "the native tobacco was already cut down considerably also by the Government intervention" and "the native tobacco is the very important source of their income which cannot be replaced by others in various regions and in some regions it is perhaps difficult to reduce this income, now that at present the price of the most important daily needs like clothing continues to rise to a very high level" [Nota beperking 1918], they directed on 12 March 1919 to the residents concerned that "considering the fear that broad acreages shall not produce food, Governor General instruct you to limit the area of native tobacco planted and of its seed bed soon in March and April in your residency to less than that of the same months of 1918..... As for the tobacco planted after April you are to receive the detailed direction later." [GS 1919 no.73x]

Consequently the cultivation of the people's tobacco decreased to 134,000 bouws in 1917, 145,000 bouws in 1918 [Nota beperking 1918] and 140,072 bouws in 1919 [KV 1920:256], and so far Government measures for the restriction can be said successful. On the other hand, however, it is also true that the people was not always cooperative with them as is shown in the following reports, saying that "the people planted 'naoogst tobacco' in large area throughout the region fitted to it, stimulated by the favourable price expectation." [VHNL 1919:252] and that "in various regions of the Principalities the cultivations of tobacco and indigo by the people are much expanded in such places as 'geblag land' of Gejayan Estate or 'lungguh lands' in Klaten where people used to plant food crops for some years." [ASS 1919]

3. Actual result of the food production increase and of the saving of rice consumption

Then how was the actual increase in food production? We see this from the table 6 and 7. First we can notice a considerable increase in the cultivated acreage and especially remarkable expansion of dry field, which suggests that the people inclined to produce more food also by clearing the waste land. Second, the yield of wet rice increased much until 1919 and dropped considerably in 1920. The total of harvested and failed acreage also increased until 1919, with a sudden and remarkable rise in 1918, and somewhat fell in 1920, which is, however, still larger than in 1917. If we calculate their percentage of the total acreage of wet rice field the figure rises from 99.5% in 1916 and 1917 to 103.1% in 1918 and 102.5% in 1919, which shows the development of wet rice cultivation in the dry season. Thus, we can say that the people plant wet rice actively in this period. Also the dry land rice shows considerable increase in acreage.

However, secondary crops show much more expansion than rice, which is thought to be the result from the expansion of dry land and that of turning from the tobacco cultivation. Among others the large yield of maize in 1919 and 1920 and the sudden expansion of cassava since 1918 seem to have contributed much to the saving of rice consumption mentioned bellow.

It is maybe in April 1918 that the Government at first instructed to save rice consumption and to encourage consuming other food-stuffs to regional administrative chiefs. Since then these were always emphasized. For this purpose they took in 1918 such measures as supply other food-stuffs than rice through Central Distribution Bureau, importing soybean and wheat flour and prohibiting maize export. Among others great importance was attached to the supply of *gaplek*, and its export from the main producing center of Priangan was banned when the price suddenly rose because of speculation, along with establishing the special organization for its purchasing and processing under the leadership of Agricultural Advisor in Bandung which sold *gaplek* to such regions as Central Java. And the Government purchase of paddy introduced in the same year also had the purpose of "curbing maximum rice consumption immediately after the harvest." [MAB 1919:46 - 49; 1921:51]

As for the Outer Islands regional administrative chiefs were authorized in 1919 by the Government Decree dated 26 August (Stbl.no.560) to fixed the maximum amount of rice per head calculated to be sufficient for the labourers for a certain period who were working at the enterprizes there in accordance with the Coolie ordinance, and the employers were ordered to take care not to supply more rice to them than prescribed [MAB 1920:118]. At the beginning of 1920 the maize export from Java and Madura to the Outer Islands was temporarily banned, aiming to prevent the price from soaring by the increasing purchase in Java and to ensure the fair distribution of its stocks [Stbl.no.24], and the Government monopolized the purchase of the surplus maize in Pasuruan and Besuki for supplying to the food-short regions. Also the use of maize as the livestock feed was prohibited [MAB 1921:51- 52].

Then how was the process of saving rice consumption and turning to other food-stuffs? We can consider a considerable part of rice consumption was replaced by other food-stuffs, judging from a letter written in May 1919 which says that "throughout East Java and in the regions westward to Yogyakarta maize has already replaced inignorable percentage of the daily rice consumption of the native people. Also in West Java this attempt has got good results until now." [Sekretatis Rubber 1919] and also from the above mentioned marked increase in the harvested acreage of maize and cassava and the massive supply of them by the Central Distribution Bureau shown in table 9. In fact, according to Landbouwatlas

1926 [83 - 84] the rice consumption per head in Java and Madura decreased from 1.65 *piculs* in 1913 to 1.40 *piculs* in 1920.

However, it did not always proceed so smoothly, for we find such descriptions as "this kind of change we could make only very slowly as was taught by the history" [MAB 1920:118], or "The attempt to make the people change their diet and by which decrease their rice consumption in connection with the present rice shortage has not yet delivered enough results, and it was especially difficult to bring other food into the people in West Java whose main diet had been rice." [GG 1919 no.41a/4x] After all rice remained to be the main food of the people. In the next two chapters we, focusing on rice, examine the government rice sale and its purchase for this purpose.

Distribution of the Government Food

1. Outline of the Distribution

The food distribution by the Colonial Government began in February 1918 through providing government stock rice to each of 14 regions in Java and Madura and the Outer Islands when the private trade became impossible to meet with their needs [MAB 1919:46], and continued until 15 April 1921 when every restriction on the rice trade and transport within Indonesia was abolished by the Government Decree no. 1x (Stbl.no.179) dated 21 March [EB 1974:372~373; MAB 1921:55].

We can simplify the rice flow in Java and Madura after these measures taken, though more complicated in practice, into such three patterns as shown in the figure: (A) shows the case of the residency where rice production was as same as its need, and here every rice provided to the people was purchased within the residency itself. Pattern (B) is the case of rice short-residency and (C) that of rice-surplus one. In (B) people were provided with the foreign rice from the Central Distribution Bureau or the rice from other residencies beyond the rice purchased from the peasants within the residency itself. In (C), on the contrary, the paddy bought up from the peasants was partly supplied to the people there but partly went to the outside area.

Rice shortage or surplus in each residency is shown in table 8. According to Landbouwatlas 1916 the regions producing paddy less than 2.25 *piculs* per head needed rice import and those doing more than 4.00 *piculs* could export it, and that between the two could be self-sufficing in rice.

Now we see the distributed quantity at first. As we cannot get datas concerning this in each of the residencies, we start with the data on the actual results of rice supply by the Central Distribution Bureau in table 9. In Java and Madura, according to this, more than 1,000,000 *piculs* rice was already distributed in 1918 and the amount increased further in 1919 and 1920. That the

supply of other food than rice also reached to large amount shows the seriousness of the food situation in both years.

As for the kind of rice supplied, we can get datas only in the year 1918 and 1920. In the former year 1,400,000 *piculs* foreign rice and 88,000 *piculs* domestic rice was distributed in the whole Indonesia [MAB 1919:46]. In 1920 Java and Madura alone was supplied with 600,000 *piculs*, thus much increased amount of domestic rice along with 300,000 *piculs* foreign rice [Jaarboek LNH 1920:224]. They were transported to the rice deficient regions and sold to the people along with the rice purchased there. Next we consider the details of this process in 3 regions.

3. Rice selling in Surakarta city in 1918 and 1919

In Surakarta city, according to the report of a resident of Surakarta on 10 February 1919 [Res. Surakarta 1919 no.2422/2], regional government received Government rice in October, November and the first half of December and began to distribute it. At first the resident handed it to Chinese large traders at the cost price and the latter sold it to middlemen at the price stipulated by the resident, and consumers got it via retail traders who sold it at less than the maximum price stipulated. However, because of the upward tendency of rice price at the time, large traders were reluctant to sell and middlemen tried to raise the selling price, by which the attempt to keep the maximum price by the regional government and by the police became impossible as in other regions. So they tried to introduce a new system in which rice was procured to middlemen directly from the resident excluding large traders, but the maximum price could not be yet kept because the large traders ensured rice through the intermediary agents and the middlemen did not obey to the instruction of price in spite of large supply. As a result the complete exclusion of commerce was planned and in 20 December a new system was introduced in which the regional government stocked every rice that would be handed down to the women retail traders who sold it in the markets under the observation of the police. Further, since 13 January 1919 the regional government began direct sale, in which the rice stocked in the government storehouses was sent to the several selling places founded in the city several times a week and sold to the consumers by less than 5 *katties* per head. This system at first caused disorder, but after the selling place was increased to 14, the situation was said to be improved. Each selling place sold 2.5-4 *katties* rice per head to 2,000 to 2,500 people a day, in total about 35-70 *piculs*. And this method was said to be adopted also outside the city and continued for several months. The actual business was done by the women staffs who received salary from this organization and worked under the supervision of the rice sale *mantris*. The whole day money received was handed into the government treasury by the *mantris* via assistant tax-collector

after the end of each day's sale. The general superintendence of the business was done by the controller in Surakarta city and Wonogiri and by the assistant residents in each afdeeling.

The resident says that by this system consumers could get rice cheaper than before, the maximum domestic rice price could be kept and the rice supply became stable.

3. The Sale of Food-stuffs in Yogyakarta in 1918

Now we turn to examine the recorded sale of food-stuffs by the regional government in Yogyakarta which began in March 1918, basing on the resident's report dated at 12 February 1919 (Rapport Res. Yogyakarta 1919).

As is shown in table 10, the amount of rice sold in the first stage was not much, which was the result of unrestricted rice import and private sale admitted to merchants at that time. And the introduction of this system at first mainly aimed to prevent speculative rice trade. Rice sale by the government, however, increased after imposing restrictions on the rice import to this region.

Here as it was said that "with this food distribution it is never aimed to control the whole supply and to extend the Government intervention to the free trade, because if so the proper existence of this free trade will be endangered. This principle of not going beyond the supply to the retail traders with this supply is, along with the somewhat large scale direct sale to consumers by small amount at the cost price in the Government selling places, always kept with the result that the retail traders of rice and other food are far from being perished, on the contrary, they are now much prosperous and by this consumers experience no difficulty for providing themselves locally with the necessary food," the government adopted two systems of distribution, that is, direct sale from the government and the other which utilized retail traders.

They differ from that of Surakarta in excluding the large and intermediate traders from the beginning, but the Chinese merchants cooperated in selling and storing the rice from the beginning. Chinese Captain Yap Hon Sing took on storing of the government rice gratis and their warehouses were used as selling places as the resident's proclamation on 30 January 1919 says that "the above-mentioned kinds of food is, except for the Java rice on which separate mention is done, able to get, as long as the stock lasts, at the warehouses of the firm Yap Siau Hong in the Tugu station yard and Lempuyanganby quantity of at least one bag of about 1.75 *picul* at the following prices...."and "The Javanese rice is offered only by a bag of 1/4 *picul* at f4 at a time, which is sold in the auction room of the firm Yap Siau Hong telephone No.375 in Ketandan quarter behind the great market."

The maximum selling prices in each afdeeling on 30 January 1919 are shown in table 11. The resident said that it was at this time that he for the first time fixed the maximum price of domestic rice, and that until then he avoided doing so, intending that the peasants could draw enough profit from the high price, which had made domestic rice somewhat expensive but bore no problem because of its good quality and large demand for it.

4. Food-stuff distribution in Surabaya

In Surabaya, also a typical rice-short region, a regional food commission was established with the resident's order no. 159/80 on 3 March 1919 along with the local food commissions which were founded in Sidoarjo, Mojokerto, Jombang and Gresik, and the regular food sale by the government began in the year [Notulen vergadering 1919A]. The following description is mainly based upon J.F. Verhoog's "Report on the Food Distribution in the region of Surabaya" which was submitted to the Government on 28 July 1921 [Rapport Verhoog 1921].

The way of distribution much differed before and after Verhoog's appointment to the Controller for Food Distribution. Before his arrival at this office, government rice was directly furnished from the "Commercio" (Commercial section of Dept. of A.I.C.) to the assistant residents, who themselves were responsible for the payment to Government and entrusted its sale to merchants. The furnished amount at this stage is shown in table 12. And as the business was too much complicated, this office was newly established preparing for the full scale rice sale with the introduction of the following new method.

Tasks like accepting, storing of the government rice, etc. were entrusted to Surabaya Warehouse Co. (Surabaya Veem) and Stroohoeden Warehouse Co. (Stroohoeden Veem). And the payment to the government treasury was done via Java Bank.

Food was sold through the following 5 courses. The first was for the sale within Surabaya city, in which food was furnished from the Controller to the city government and sold to the consumers at the selling places established by the latter. In this case general supervision was done by the Controller but the city government was responsible for the direct command of sale which was done in small unit (*kattie*) by the women retail rice traders. In the second course food was reached to the consumers from the Controller via the hands of large and small traders, and which was said to enable rice supply to the remote districts. Through the third the Controller provided rice for "warung". The fourth aimed at the distribution in each afdeeling. Rice was handed down from the Controller to the Chinese merchants in each afdeeling who were appointed by the assistant resident, and supplied amount, which was fixed in each afdeeling, reached to 30,000 *piculs* a month in total. In the fifth the Controller sent rice to the selling places via

assistant residents, but this was done only in the towns of Gresik, Lamongan and Mojokerto where rice price sold by the traders were higher than the maximum price.

The amount of various kinds of food sold in this way is shown in table 13. Besides the selling for cash which was pursued as far as possible, ticket system of rice distribution was also introduced, with the aim to force people to save its consumption, and several thousands pieces of the ticket were published, which system was, however, scarcely made use of and the system itself was abolished with the improved foreign rice import in the latter half of 1920.

This report also pointed out various problems occurred. Among others quality of rice distributed within Surabaya city was most serious. To this city domestic rice which, but for Lombok rice, was ranked as secondary quality and a large quantity of yellowish Saigon rice of poor quality were supplied. This caused repulsion of the people who had been accustomed to take the high quality rice produced in the vicinities and brought into the city by the Chinese merchants, so the critical accounts often appeared in the newspapers.

Then why didn't the high quality rice come to Surabaya city? This is closely connected to the problem of rice price.

The Colonial Government planned to fix the maximum price for purchasing paddy and selling rice when they began to control their flow. This was first discussed in a meeting with the residents held in Yogyakarta on 9 December 1918, and the meeting came to the conclusion that the maximum price could be applicable to the sale of at least more than 1 *picul* rice but the general application was impossible due to the different conditions in each region. On this opportunity the resident of Surabaya specially insisted that the regional chiefs should be rapidly authorized to set it in each residency. Consequently, on 24 December the director of Dept. of A.I.C. requested Governor General to authorize regional chiefs to fix the maximum price, if necessary, of people's main food, rice [Dir.LNH 1918 no.129555/A], and as a result they got this authority [GS 1918 no.707x]. The above-mentioned maximum price in Surakarta and Yogyakarta was the result of this.

It is not clear how the maximum price was fixed in Surabaya in 1919, but in accordance with the introduction of the unified maximum rice price (2 x paddy price + fl.25 as the wage of rice milling and commercial margin) throughout Java and Madura with the start of the forced purchase of paddy in February 1920 which had to be enforced before 1 April [GS 1920 no.131x], new maximum price of fl4.25/*picul* was fixed here. However, it was only effective outside Surabaya city. As for the inside of the city, the previously applied higher price was maintained aiming at the easy rice flow into the city, which indeed promoted purchase by rice traders.

Faced with such a movement in Surabaya, however, the director of Dept. of A.I.C. persistently required to set a maximum price which would be valid throughout the residency. The resident, unable to approve this, requested the decision of Governor General, but at last with the telegraph on 26 July 1920 it was ordered to fix the unified maximum price.

As a result Chinese merchants, who had bought up more expensive rice for the city in each afdeeling, suffered so much that they held an assembly to decide to stop rice sale. Consequently, the city government increased selling places since August to 111 for ensuring the supply within the city and sold there totally 2,000 *piculs* a day. At the same time they confiscated 23,000 *piculs* rice stock from the Chinese merchants, but as it was equal to only 10 days' consumption, they asked help of Commercio. This is the reason of supplying a huge amount of Saigon rice.

After a while the distribution of Saigon rice within the city was wholly stopped due to the coming of high quality rice, but the cheap rice supply did not continue long and the regional government needed to raise maximum price once again at the beginning of September. The Chinese merchants organization claimed damages of allegedly f50,000 which they suffered directly from the government measures, and the resident, after negotiating with them, proposed to Governor General the payment of special compensation of f1.00/*picul* with his letter on 18 October and it was approved. The total compensation amounted to f22,823.43, to which a part of the profit obtained from the food sale was appropriated.

Until now we have examined the details of food distribution in 3 rice-short regions. There were, of course, many other ways of distribution adopted in Java and Madura. For example, we can find in Notulen vergadering [1919-11] such cases as the *desa* chiefs sold rice directly to the consumers (Priangan and Pekalongan in 1919) or the purchased paddy was once reserved in the *lumbung desa* and sold to the people who needed it after they were registered (Cirebon), but most of them tended to utilize the existing commercial network in some way or other as in 3 above-mentioned examples. At the same time, however, the Colonial Government tried to restrict the freedom of trade by setting the artificial maximum price, and it is what caused the resistance of the commerce. The situations appeared in Surakarta and Surabaya were its typical examples.

Such resistance can be found in the purchase of paddy. In the next chapter we will turn to this subject.

Purchase of paddy

1. Actual result of the purchase of paddy and its ways

The purchase of paddy in Java and Madura, which began in 1918 and amounted only to about 400,000 *piculs* in that year, got into the full swing since 1919, when

the rice import showed a marked decrease. The Colonial Government set up 10 millions *piculs* as the target in 1919 and 1920, with the result of buying up 6,867,450 *piculs* and about 6 million *piculs* purchase respectively. First we take its overview.

In 1918 there was not a unified principle of purchase, which was described "... the Government bought paddy locally by the intermediary of the chiefs of regional administration... the control of this stock was vested not in the Central Distribution Bureau but in the chiefs of regional administration" [MAB 1919:46]. Also in 1919 its practical means seemed to be left in the hand of regional officials, since the report of a meeting attended by the residents and the officials of Dept. of A.I.C. said as follows: "Purchase of paddy in 1919 had to be carried out in various ways in each region due to the lack of experiences, and left a lesson that it is desirable to make a more unified principle. As the buying price and the maximum price intended to apply were various, smuggling appeared widely. So the steps must be taken which can prevent it as far as possible." [*Verslag bespreking*, 1920]. At the same time, however, we must pay attention to the fact that in some regions peasants were forced to deliver their paddy, as was mentioned in the same report: "Preference should be offered to the levying of a certain amount of paddy per unit acreage, which has produced good result in Surabaya and especially in Priangan." This was the pre-emptive execution of the forced delivery applied in the next year.

Anyhow the Council of the Indies, considering such a view, advised on 5 February 1920 that the unified rule of paddy purchase should be fixed [Raad van N.I. 1920], with the result that the Colonial Government ordered the forced delivery of paddy in the state domain by the decree no. 1x at 16 February (Stbl. no. 82).

This decree is composed of six articles including the following significant ones: the obligatory delivery of 1/10 of harvest (art. 2-1), transference at the places designated by the officials appointed by the regional administrative chiefs (art. 3), standard price for the payment to those who deliver, which is set at f6.50 per *picul* of the first class dried paddy (art. 4-1) and the authority of the regional administrative chiefs to fix the price paid for the insufficiently dried or poor quality paddy.

According to its official explanation, it aimed to resolve the problems confronted through unifying the rule and price, especially to prevent interregional smuggling. And the following five points should be paid attention to when the delivery was carried out, that is: (1) in the regions where communal land ownership prevailed each *desa* must deliver 1/10 of its harvest, (2) delivery of less than 1/10 by special reason was admitted, but the effort to make the delivery more than 1/10 must be done in the rice-surplus regions, (3) f6.50/*picul* was also

applied to the maximum rice price of the private trade. (4) the price of unhusked rice was fixed at $\frac{4}{3}$ of the paddy price and that of rice at the double price of the former plus f1.25 (wage of rice milling plus commercial margin). (5) ban on the interregional rice trade should not be withdrawn after finishing the main harvest. And the price of f6.50/picul was explained as the price also sufficient for the peasant to draw profit from the high rice price in the world market [GS 1920 no.131x].

Then how had the paddy been purchased before the enforcement of this decree? What was the "smuggling" and by what reason it prevailed? And how the forced delivery in 1920 was materialized in each region and what problem occurred with this? Next we will consider these points in the cases of Besuki and Surabaya.

2. Purchase of rice and paddy in Besuki in 1919

Besuki was known as a rice export region, as K.V.1892 *bijlage C* reported that a large quantity of rice was transported from here to Probolinggo, Pasuruan, Madura and Bali. And according to the report of *Onderzoek naar de mindere welvaart der bevolking* at the beginning of this century many rice mills operated here, especially in Banyuwangi afdeeling [M.H.H.394: *De Volkswelvaart Xa, deel 1, 1914:212-213*] and the polished rice or paddy was transported to Pasuruan, Surabaya and Madura etc. by train or ship and a part of the rice produced in Jember and Banyuwangi was further exported to Europe from the port of Surabaya and Banyuwangi [M.W.L.Besuki:203; M.W.H.Besuki: 359, 360, 361, 362].

Thus the Colonial Government expected Besuki to deliver the rice for supplying to other regions. On 13 March 1920, however, director of Dept. of A.I.C. expressed his discontent with the amount of rice offered from Besuki in 1919, referring to his "long continued impression of lacking efficient intervention of the resident that caused insufficient rice offer from Besuki" [Dir.L.N.H.1920 no.53/g]. Until then there had been frequent mutual communications between the resident and the director by telegraph, and the latter sent J.G.Hoekman in August 1919 and De Vries from 26 February to 4 March 1920 to Besuki to survey its causes.

Purchase was done in two ways, that is, (a) the direct purchase from the peasants and (b) the delivery of rice from the rice mills. First we consider (a). The resident assured by the telegram on 24 July 1919 300,000 *piculs* rice purchase at f3.50/picul, which amount was somewhat revised downwards by his telegram two days later, saying that "direct purchase is not more than 300,000 *piculs*." Anyhow, actual purchase in March 1920 amounted only to 140,000 *piculs* (see table 14).

Assistant residents of Jember and Banyuwangi, when asked of this reason, both explained that the suitable time had already passed for buying up paddy, and it is noteworthy that the latter said further that "competition with the rice mills also troubled the purchase, who paid more than f3.50 by adding every form of premium to the maximum price." [Vries 1920] This answer shows that the rice mills paid more than the maximum price.

Whether this maximum price was suitable or not was a subject for discussion from the beginning in the telegrams exchanged between the resident and the director. The resident asked admission to raise it at 26 July, saying that the "buying up price should be raised to more than f3.50. I will wait for your answer", and insisted again on its need on 4 August. The director, however, rejected his request by the telegrams on 28 July and 5 August, with the result that this price was kept until its abolition in December on which we will mention later. This is the basic reason why they were unable to match rice mills at the purchase.

Moreover, almost all the purchased paddy, which was originally intended to be husked and sent to the Central Distribution Bureau, remained in each afdeeling in March 1920 as is shown in table 14. Vries attributed this to the delayed contract with rice mills (Jember, Banyuwangi) and the misunderstanding of residents who considered it as the stock for their own afdeeling (Panarukan, Bondowoso). In this way, paddy purchase in Besuki in 1919 was much confused and did not proceed, contrary to the expectation of the Government.

Now we turn to (b) and examine the delivery of rice from rice mills. In his telegram on 26 July 1919 the resident reported to the director that "on 25 of this month rice mills complied with the contract of delivering 210,000 *piculs* rice by way of transferring 30,000 *piculs* rice each month at f 12/*picul* free on truck at the nearest stations." The director answered to this on 28 July as follows. "The price of f 12 is too expensive..... Make rice mills deliver it in the form of rice after husking at the given wage. Make them stock it without rent paying the charge for storing. The amount and the destination of delivery should be determined by our department. the transfer of 30,000 *piculs* in each month is not proper. If necessary, seize their stock." The resident telegraphed on 4 August that "the transfer of 30,000 *piculs* in each month is proper considering from their ability in husking and the transportation means", but the director directed next day that "send the detailed information on the rice milling contract and inform me when the delivery can be begun." Then the resident reported with the telegram on 11 August that "I want to make the contract for delivery of 7,000 *piculs* rice at f10-11/*picul* with the rice mills in Jember. Please admit it. Other rice mills would agree to close contract at this price. They do not want to contract for the rice husking", but the director directed in the next day to "in from the rice mills' purchasing price of paddy in Jember and Banyuwangi." It means that the latter considered the delivery

price too expensive. The resident, in reply to this, telegraphed on 13 that "I don't know their average purchasing price because of the existence of credit system. Rice mills claim f 3.50. The average rice price is at present f10 and the price of rice delivered to the Government at the rice mills was between f10 and f11 between September 1919 and March 1920. so the average price f10.5 is fair. Please inform me of the data on the delivery and its amount per month. If so, I can conclude the contract. And Banyuwangi deliver 900,000 *piculs*, Jember 700,000 *piculs*. I will endeavor to assure 2 million *piculs* from now on."

From the above-mentioned it became clear that the resident gradually cut down the purchasing price planned at the beginning obeying to the opinion of the director but the latter was still unsatisfied, and also that the resident tried to set more realistic condition than the latter. Anyhow, the actual delivery could not produce enough result in this period.

It was by this reason that the dept. of A.I.C. sent Hoekman to Besuki, and according to his report dated 19 August (Hoekman 1919) the situation was as follows.

Hoekman at first had a talk with the owners of rice mill and proposed the delivery of 46% polished rice at the price calculated from the at that time valid maximum purchasing price of f3.50/*picul*, that is, f 9.00 in the first delivery month of September, f10.00 in the last delivery month of March, and f9.50 on average. The owners, however, rejected it, insisting that the f3.50 did not contain the cost for transportation to rice mills and that they did not want to supply at less than f10.50. So Hoekman consulted with the resident and they agreed on such points: (1) they would not permit the rice mills to export rice and the state railway would not cooperate on this export, (2) they would not raise the present maximum price of f3.50, (3) the Government would purchase paddy in case the rice mills did not do it, (4) they would not immediately seize the rice of the rice mills and wait until Pownall, leader of the rice mills, would accept f9.50, (5) the resident would shut down the boundary of his residency more strictly and if necessary also close the boundary of afdeeling Banyuwangi, (6) the resident would prohibit maize export to prevent the rise of rice price, (7) the people would not be compelled to sell their rice to the Government nor be seized their rice stock. As for the paddy which the rice mills had already bought up by this time, it amounted to 200,000 *piculs*.

It is not clear how the situation since then changed until November, but with his letter no. 13775/A on 1 December the director said to the resident that "in case of concluding the delivery contract at f10, you can abolish the maximum paddy price", and with this the resident raised the maximum rice price by 50 cents to f10, and abolished the maximum paddy price. Then he entered into negotiation with the rice mills proposing the condition, and succeeded in making them promise to offer

62,000 *piculs* rice, in spite of passing the suitable time for the contract, by threatening to confiscate their stocks [Resident Besuki 1920 no.226].

This contract was not, however, excuted smoothly. According to his report Fries talked with Pownall in 3 March for the first time, and on this occasion the latter, though at first declaring that he did not want to conclude a contract with the Government, at last promised the delivery of 3,000 *piculs* rice and also 2,000 *piculs* better quality polished rice (*tafelrijst*) at f12 when Fries threatened with seizing his stock to husk in other mills.[Vries 1920]

In this way the rice offered by the rice mills at the beginning of March, shown in table 15, amounted nearly to 90% of the delivery contracted in December, but far below the 210,000 *piculs* that the resident had expected at the beginning. Moreover, though the total stock of the rice mills that Fries surveyed contained at the time 20,000 *piculs* paddy and 2,400 *piculs* rice, most of them were to supply to the demand of Bondowoso city and the estates in long lease and so they could be scarcely delivered.

Then, why the rice mills could not offer rice? According to Fries it was attributed to the fact that (1) the fixed price of f9.50 lasted long, (2) rice mills did not have enough paddy when requested to offer 200,000 *piculs* at f12/*picul*, and (3) they could not get profit because of the rising paddy price when the contract was at last made at f10. The last point was especially influenced by the sudden rise of the paddy price to, according to the statement of the assistant resident of Jember in the meeting held on 4 March, f6 after abolishing the maximum price in December. Fries said that "the rice mills having obtained paddy at this price naturally do not want to offer at f10.50." In short the condition proposed by the Government, especially of the price, was unrealistic if viewed from the actual situation of business in the region.

Then where did the abundant paddy and rice produced here go? Perhaps it flowed to outside the residency. One reason which leads to such an idea is the fact that in Besuki rice export as the baggage of 60kg per head by train and of 60 *kattie* by ship was permitted with the resident order no.555/4 on 5 July 1918 and this was very much in vogue. Moreover, withdrawal of this permission with the resident order on 27 February 1920 was only incompletely made known [Res. Besuki 1920 no.226]. For example, when Fries, witnessing 14 packages rice of 5 men which totally weighed 420kg was transported by the 859 train from Kalibaru station in Banyuwangi to Mrawan station in Jember, pointed out its unlawfulness to the Kalibaru Station Master, the latter replied to him, according to Fries, that the transportation as the baggage had to be permitted because the withdrawal of the resident order had not yet been officially made known [Vries 1920]. Further, the "smuggling" was not fully controlled at the border of the residency and the port directors of Panarukan and Banyuwangi said that a large

quantity was smuggled by sea and there was a large possibility of systematic smuggling [Vries 1920].

The Government, defining this as the "smuggling", wanted to take measures against it. Viewed from the side of Besuki society which had exported rice before, however, it was not irregularity in any sense. Moreover, as the rice price in Besuki was lower than in other regions, for example, the price of f3.87 in October 1919 was the lowest of all residencies, and as the maximum purchasing price at that time, f3.50, was below it, it is not surprising that the rice flowed out to such rice short-regions as Surabaya or Madura where the price was higher, respectively f6.69 and f9.31 [*Verslag aanplant en oogst* 1919-10]. Indeed, the resident of Besuki pointed out that the smuggling to Madura and the adjacent islands from the north coast was most popular [Res.Besuki 1920 no.226], and from December 1920 to February 1921 40,000-50,000 *piculs* rice was smuggled from Besuki to Surabaya [Rapport Verhoog 1921].

3. Purchase of paddy in Surabaya and its problems

In Surabaya paddy purchase began in 1919, and resulted in the amount of 515,222.06 *piculs* in 1919 and 520,857.45 *piculs* in 1920 (see table 16). We mention its details basing mainly on the report of Verhoog.

Forced delivery was materialized with the resident order no.53/10 (25 February) and no.78/10 (31 March). According to them it is the wedana who ordered to deliver the dried paddy of 1/10 of the harvest, under the control and guidance of the controller and assistant resident. In case of double cropping the peasants were obliged to offer paddy once a year from the main harvest. Price of the poor quality paddy was set at f5.75/*picul* by the resident.

Here delivery was done by each desa, and the assistant resident determined the harvested amount in each desa basing upon the datas on landrent and the experimental harvesting, taking the observable damages by the crop disease and insect into the account. Redivison of this amount among the villagers was trusted to each desa and its method was recorded in the assessment lists which wedana made. Offering was done at the government storehouses at the date fixed by the assistant resident, and immediately after that payment was done to each *humbung* desa by the lower officials appointed by the wedana in the presence of the desa chief and officials concerned. To those who stood outside the desa relations wedana ordered the delivery of 1/10 of the harvest.

This forced delivery was stopped here in November as a result of importing large amount of foreign rice and the declined price with it. This system caused discontent of the people in various places in Java and Madura, and the nationalists were deeply concerned with it. For example, many delegates of the local branches expressed their discontent against its increased burden at the Boedi Oetomo

Congress held in October 1920, and Sarekat Islam began campaigns against the rice sale to the Government in Oetoesan Hindia already at the beginning of 1919 [Telegram 1919 no.120x]. In Surabaya, however, though some movements against the delivery were observed, there seems to have been few political objections as was reported: "it goes well without any confusions in the political field." Here the most serious problem is rather the intense competition for buying up paddy with the Chinese merchants appeared since immediately after the harvest of 1920. On this the resident says as follows.

"According to rumor, there is no place where the maximum price is kept even at the peak period of harvest. Buyers of paddy and rice dare to pay higher (than the maximum price) because they know that the demand exceeds supply in Surabaya which does not have enough rice and that the Government can not force down this price because they must supply the shortage by the higher price foreign rice. In this case Java rice, to which consumers here always prefer, can be sold at the higher price and it is this that buyers expect. Somewhat strongly sticking to the maximum price leads to the decreasing supply of rice to the markets with the result that the common people can not get rice easily, because the merchants will sell it secretly at the higher price." [Res.Surabaya 1920 no.481g]


The merchants transported the rice bought up in this way to Surabaya city, as a result in Sidoarjo and Lamongan, where especially large amount of rice was sent to outside, there appeared not only the fear that 1/10 of the harvest could not be collected but also that of rice shortage. To avoid this, the resident proposed the ban on the export of paddy and rice from these afdeelings and it was carried out with the orders of the director of Dept. of A.I.C. no.8007/13 (21 July 1920) and no.6915/13 (3 July). This was lifted with his order no.11558/13 dated 3 November because of the stopping of rice purchase.

In this way the Government measures for the purchase of paddy also had to encounter strong resistance from the side of the commerce.

Postscript

In this report we have examined the food crisis and the government measures against it from the end of 1910s to 1920 focusing on Java and Madura. At last we look back what we have said and consider some points.

The food crisis in the period originated from the decreased rice import. The Colonial Government tried to overcome the situation through the production increase and the control of food flow, and as there was no report telling the occurrence of starvation at that time, we can say that the government measures basically succeeded in this sense. It was attributed to the increasing food production at the cost of the people's cash crops cultivation, and also to such a



large amount of food stock as more than 6 million *piculs* paddy etc. which the Government could ensure in 1919 and 1920 for distribution.

Among these government measures, however, the control of the rice flow in Java and Madura encountered especially strong resistance from the commerce. The key to it lies in the maximum price. It was fixed in each residency until 1920, and the unified price was introduced along with the introduction of the forced delivery. It was, however, much difficult to keep it even in 1918 and 1919. Besides the examples already mentioned, the fact that many residents expressed the difficulty of sticking to it in a conference held on 20 November 1919, saying that if such was done rice and paddy disappeared from the market also holds this view. [Notulen vergadering 1919B]

As for the control of the commerce, there was a considerable difference between the stance of residents and Batavia (Department of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce). The confrontation between them on the maximum price in 1920 in Surabaya mentioned in Ch.3, and that on the conditions of delivery by the rice mills in Besuki in Ch.4, shows that the policy proposed by the residents based more on the actual state of commerce but the latter wanted to realize more unified policy. And the state of affairs proceeded along the idea of Batavia.

It reached to its peak as the unified maximum price was set in 1920. Notwithstanding the situation that even the maximum price in each residency could not be kept and that many residents raised "the protest against the unified price fixed, regardless of the very different conditions in each residency" [Nota Mook 1920], it was enforced. It produced, however, such result as "it could be indeed take for granted that with the maximum price what the Government aimed at with it was not completely attained. The public hardly minded it and usually hardly expected to the measures to keep this price also because they must pay more for the inferior imported rice than for the good native grades." [MAB 1921:53] A concrete instance of this is shown by the case in Surabaya.

Then, why the maximum price could not be kept? If we see the up and down of paddy price in 1920 from table 17, the average price in Java and Madura exceeded f6.50 in every month. It means that the maximum price was too low compared with the market price. Secondly, though the latter in some regions like Besuki was indeed lower than the former, the merchants could easily get profit if they "smuggle" paddy to such regions where the price was higher. Though we have already mentioned several examples of this, here we add still a few more. In a meeting of regional administrative chiefs and the Governor General held on 20 November 1919, the resident of Pekalongan said that his residency had enough food and that according to his impression much rice was concealed and had been smuggled to other regions until shortly before. The resident of Madiun also pointed out that "a large amount of rice is smuggled to Kediri because the rice

price there is f6 higher than in Madiun". [*Notulen vergadering* 1919B] And the Council of the Indies also confessed in its advice on 5 February 1920 that "in Java regulations (on the paddy purchase) differed so much that we can not control the rice transportation by train etc. effectively at least in the long term." [Raad van N.I.1920] As the control of the inter regional trade was thus incomplete, it is very natural that the maximum price could not be kept.

This means, after all, that the Government could not wholly regulate the flow of paddy and rice. This is also shown in the fact that the actual result of paddy purchase was considerably less than the aimed amount both in 1919 and 1920. Consequently the Colonial Government had to adopt the inconsistent policy in which they limited the commerce on one side and asked its cooperation on the other side. Thus it is not suprizing that the Colonial Government encountered firm resistance from the commerce.

Then, how were the characteristics of the trade of rice and paddy at that time? We have few studies on this point. This is the next subject that we should examine from now on.

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GS 1919 no.73x: *1ste Gouvernements Secretaris aan den Resident van a.Serang. b.Batavia. c.Bandoeng. d.Cheribon. e.Pekalongan. f.Semarang. g.Rembang. h Soerabaja. i.Pasoeroean. j.Bondowoso. k.Banjoemas. l.MageLang. m.Djogdjakarta. Soerakarta. o.Madioen. p.Kediri. q.Pamekasan r.Singaradja. Telegram no.73x.* 12 Maart 1919, mr 242g/ 19, Vb 18-10-19-23

GS 1919 no.1235/: *Gouvernements Secretaris aan den Directeur van Landbouw. Nijverheid en Handel.*no.1235/, 6 Mei 1919, mr 1007/19, Vb 18-10-19-25

GS 1920 no.112ax: *Gouvernements-Secretaris aan den resident van a.Solo.b.Djogdjakarta. Eigenhandigd,* no.112ax, 16 Febr.1920, mr 227g/20, Vb 27-5-21-67

GS 1920 no.131x: *1e Gouvernements sekretaris aan den resident van Java en Madoera,* no.131,23 Febr.1920, mr 227g/20, Vb 27-5-21-67, EB 323

Hoekman 1919: *Bijlage van de brief van Directeur van Landbouw.Nijverheid en Handel aan den Gouvernment-Generaal.*no.9653/A, 26 Austus 1919, mr 623g/19, Vb 10-1-20-33

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Kern 1920 no.714/g: *Wvd. adviseur voor inlandsche zaken (R.Kern) aan gouverneur-generaal (Van Limburg Stirum),*no.714g, 6 dec.1920, mr 1338g/20, Vb 27-5-21-67, EB 364-367

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MAB 1920: *Mededeelingen omtrent enkele onderwerpen van algemeen belang* (afgesloten 1 Januari 1920)

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Notulen veradering 1919B: *Notulen van de veradering van hoofden van gewestelijk bestuur op Java en Madoera met de gouverneur-generaal (Van Limburg Stirum). 20 Nov. 1919, mr 903g/19, Vb 4-3-20-65, EB :302-303*

Notulen vergadering GC 1919A: *Notulen van de vergadering van de Gewestelijke Commissie voor de bevordering van de voedselproductie gehouden op 15 Maart 1919 ten Residentiehuize Soerabaja, mr 1212/19, Vb 18-10-19-25*

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Res.O.Sumatra 1920 no.162: Resident van Oost-Sumatra aan den Gouverneur-Generaal, no.162, 7 April 1920, mr 505g/20, Vb 7-7-21-5

Res. Soerabaja 1919 no.632/10: Resident van Soerabaja aan den Gouverneur-Generaal, no.632/10, 5 Mei 1919, mr 1212/19, Vb 18-10-19-25

Res. Soerabaja 1920 no.481g: Resident van Soerabaja aan den Gouverneur-Generaal, no.481g, 3 Juli 1920, mr 775g/20, Vb 7-7-21-21, EB:336

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Verslag aanplant en oogst 1919-10: *Verslag over den aanplant en oogst van de belangrijkste voedingsgewassen op Java en Madoera in October 1919*, mr 883g/19, Vb 12-4-21-16

Verslag bespreking 1920: *Verslag van een bespreking van enkele hoofden van gewestelijk bestuur op Java met ambtenaar van het departement van landbouw.nijverheid en handel op 23 jan.1920*, mr 127g/20, Vb 20-4-20-12. EB 313

VHNL: *Verslag omtrent Handel.Nijverheid en Landbouw van Nederlandsch-Indie gedurende ----*

Vries 1920: *Reisrapport. Reis naar residentie Besoeki*. mr 438g/20, Vb 27-5-21-67

Table 1: Rice Trade in Indonesia 1910-1921 (1.000 ton)

	1910	1911	1912	1913	1914	1915	1916	1917	1918	1919	1920	1921
Import	From Java & Madura	491.80	396.19	245.58	258.41	215.74	333.76	390.76	406.49	412.52	114.33	576.54
	Outer Islands	213.20	324.01	206.72	248.21	255.45	249.61	301.92	348.02	305.95	108.80	187.78
	Indonesia	705.01	620.20	452.31	506.62	471.20	583.36	692.68	754.52	718.48	223.13	764.32
Export	From Bengal/Burma	346.68	398.49	327.87	219.71	173.66	176.64	325.59	258.34	298.10	9.16	141.73
	Siam	135.14	123.50	77.22	115.71	107.22	169.53	243.05	344.88	277.06	184.26	160.77
	Saigon	199.51	75.66	29.53	163.49	185.24	230.78	113.65	140.75	137.25	79.65	451.54
Net Import Indonesia	From Java & Madura	52.03	53.62	47.65	63.85	38.68	33.65	4.49	4.34	2.03	2.86	0.93
	Outer Islands	7.63	2.45	4.11	3.15	3.07	3.07	9.81	1.73	0.27	1.25	1.51
	Indonesia	59.86	56.06	51.75	66.00	36.72	36.72	14.31	6.07	2.31	4.11	2.44
Net Import Indonesia		645.15	564.14	400.56	440.62	419.30	546.64	678.37	748.45	716.17	221.19	761.88

Source: *Changing Economy in Indonesia*, vol. 6, 1978; table 6.

Table 2: Rice import in Java and Madura, 1916 - 1923 (1,000 *pikul*)

Year	(a) production (1,000 <i>pikul</i>)			(b) import	(c) consumption	(b)/(c) x 100
	for food	for seed	total			
1916	48,067	2,287	50,534	6,337	56,691	11,2 %
1919	55,764	2,524	58,288	1,576	59,864	2,6%
1920	47,189	2,471	49,660	1,792	51,452	3,5%
1921	41,412	2,379	43,791	9,014	52,805	17,1%
1922	51,020	2,447	53,467	6,039	59,506	10,1%
1923	50,856	2,444	53,300	2,720	56,020	4,9%

Note : (a) is the total of wet rice and dry land rice

Source : *Landbouwaties* 1926 deel II tekst: 75

**Table 3: Rice Import in the Outer Islands
(average of the year 1915 and 1916)**

	Net Amount (tons)	per head (kg)
E. coast of Sumatera	111,421 [35,9]	145
Aceh	11,015 [3,6]	14
Tapanuli	5,722 [1,8]	8.8
Bengkulu	5,455 [1,7]	25.4
Lampung	8,346 [2,7]	52.1
Palembang	16,861 [5,4]	23.3
Jambi	7,165 [2,3]	34.4
Riau	10,098 [3,2]	54
Bangka	31,100 [10,0]	268
Biliton	7,600 [2,5]	131
West Borneo	23,250 [7,5]	49.8
Southeast Borneo	21,878 [7,0]	24.1
Celebes	9,734 [3,1]	4.9
Manado	24,024 [8,0]	34.0
Ternate	3,953 [1,3]	31.6
Ambon	8,436 [2,7]	29.4
Timor	3,824 [1,2]	4.0
Total Import	309,882 [100,0]	
Export Bali	23,454	
Export W.C. Sumatera	11,758	
Total Export	35,212	
Net Import	274,670	

Source: Smits. 1919:43

Table 4: Rice Production in Java and Madura

Year	Acreage (ban) of										Production of wet paddy (pikul)		
	(a) Arable land			(b) Harvest			(c) Crop failure			(b) + (c)		Total	per ban harvested acreage
	sawah	dry land	total	wet paddy	dry land paddy	total	wet paddy	dry land paddy	total	wet paddy	dry land paddy		
1916	4,045,021	3,861,796	7,906,817	3,724,232	549,100	4,273,332	299,999	2,620	4,573,331	4,024,225	551,720	94,137,864	23.39
1917	4,114,340	4,261,638	8,375,978	3,892,690	553,162	4,445,852	199,166	2,895	4,645,018	4,091,856	556,057	99,029,494	25.28
1918	4,227,642	4,898,860	9,126,502	4,057,699	555,134	4,612,833	298,979	8,193	4,711,832	4,356,678	563,327	100,338,666	25.44
1919	4,301,880	5,024,167	9,326,047	4,198,222	639,923	4,838,145	211,507	2,798	4,839,652	4,409,729	642,721	109,208,703	24.73
1920	4,397,598	5,256,842	9,654,440	3,897,058	643,938	4,540,996	383,657	15,672	4,556,673	4,280,715	659,610	91,810,629	26.00
1921	4,419,244	5,344,825	9,764,069	3,690,088	428,411	4,118,500	638,289	3,164	4,121,664	4,328,377	431,575	82,605,865	23.27
1922	4,420,922	5,396,689	9,817,611	4,172,592	490,009	4,662,601	230,967	1,454	4,664,055	4,403,559	491,463	100,828,975	21.95
													23.98
													22.90

Note : dry land did not include orchard, etc.

Source : *Kolonial Verslag* 1917; Bijl. CC: 1918; Bijl. V: 1919; Bijl. V: 1920; Bijl. V: 1921; Bijl. X: 1922; Bijl. X: 1923; Bijl. II.

**Table 5: Harvested acreage of secondary crops
in Java and Madura; 1916-1922 (1,000 *bau*)**

Year	Maize	Cassava	Peanuts	Soybean	Other Beans	Others	Total
1916	2,230	639	270	229	307	996	4,671
1917	2,188	718	304	248	320	1,013	4,741
1918	2,167	1,052	304	222	398	1,338	5,482
1919	2,728	1,023	244	223	361	1,248	5,828
1920	2,785	1,144	285	229	324	1,466	6,233
1921	2,104	1,107	279	226	303	1,228	5,247
1922	1,216	1,013	264	269	269	1,248	5,243

Source: K.V. 1917: Bijl.CC:1918: Bijl.W:1919:Bijl.V:1920:Bijl.W:1921:
Bijl.X:1922: Bijl.X:1923: Bijl.IJ.

Table 6: Distributed Food by the Central Distribution Bureau (*pikul*)

	Java and Madura			Outer Islands		
	1918	1919	1920	1918	1919	1920
Rice	1.138,608	1.635,503	1.904,153	212,933	1.954,571	2.911,618
Maize	-	76,064	781,844	-	109,413	186,594
Gaplek	47,400	165,123	-	-	4,818	-
Ampas	6,509	64,371	101,924	-	8,627	69,077
Soybean	-	594,250	-	-	5,193	-
Others	10,495	30,518	-	110	-	-
Total	1,203,012	2.365,829	2.787,921	213,043	2.082,622	3.157,289

Source : *Jaarboek* LNH 1920:224

**Table 7: Wet Rice Production per head
(pikul, average of the year 1919 and 1920)**

Afdeeling		Afdeeling		Afdeeling	
Serang	3.40	Kudus	1.94	Res. Madiun	2.87
Pandeglang	3.42	Jepara	2.51	Central-Java	2.79
Lebak	2.97	Res. Semarang	2.74	Surabaya	1.53
Res. Bantam	3.31	Rembang	2.15	Sidoarjo	3.24
Batavia	0.10	Tuban	2.47	Mojokerto	4.09
Mr. Cornelis	4.59	Bojonegoro	2.09	Jombang	4.76
Tangerang	4.40	Blora	3.05	Gresik	2.50
Buitenzorg	2.81	Res. Rembang	2.44	Lamongan	2.68
Krawang	5.53	Banyumas	3.27	Res. Surabaya	3.16
Res. Batavia	3.86	Purwokerto	3.61	Pamekasan	0.52
Cirebon	2.66	Purbolinggo	2.66	Sumenep	0.54
Indramayu	5.31	Banjarnegara	1.32	Bangkalan	1.21
Majalengka	3.63	Cilacap	4.69	Sampang	0.84
Res. Cirebon	3.49	Res. Banyumas	3.29	Res. Madura	0.74
Bandung	3.09	Magelang	2.33	Kediri	2.52
Cianjur	4.96	Temanggung	3.74	Tulungagung	2.42
Sukabumi	2.89	Purworejo	3.17	Berbek	2.48
Sumedang	3.52	Kebumen	3.37	Blitar	2.15
Garut	2.79	Wonosobo	2.00	Res. Kediri	2.40
Tasikmalaya	2.16	Res. Kedu	2.92	Pasuruan	2.82
Preanger	2.99	Yogyakarta	2.19	Bangil	3.10
West-Java	3.38	Kulon Progo	1.75	Malang	2.02
Pekalongan	2.16	Gn. Kidul	0.67	Probolinggo	1.92
Batang	2.28	Yogyakarta	1.80	Kraksaan	4.45
Tegal	2.97	Surakarta	2.16	Lumajang	2.97
Brebes	4.20	Klaten	2.25	Res. Pasuruan	2.64
Pemalang	3.33	Boyolali	2.28	Bondowoso	3.32
Res. Pekalongan	3.12	Sragen	2.61	Jember	3.91
Semarang	1.30	Surakarta	2.51	Panarukan	3.28
Salatiga	1.58	Madiun	3.06	Banyuwangi	5.51
Kendal	2.74	Ngawi	5.04	Res. Besuki	3.97
Demak	5.09	Magetan	2.25	East-Java	2.59
Grobogan	3.01	Ponorogo	2.23	Java and	
Pati	2.91	Pacitan	1.51	Madura	2.89

Table 8: Food Distribution in Yogyakarta from May 1918 to January 1919 (pikul)

	Various rice	Gaplek	K.K. Meal	K.K.K. Meal	Ampas	Sago	Soybean	Glutinous rice
May 1918	7.792,45							
June	9.861,80							
July	19.968,47							
August	48.344,18							995,88
September	65.211,02							770,38
October	46.838,93	853,46						331,26
November	70.083,20	7.141,59			12,51			833,92
December	57.702,88	6.199,77	571,77		308,04			1.494,73
Jan. 1919	23.659,96	2.626,11	9.604,55	1.422,80	2.338,93	605,98	3.439,49	
Total	349.462,89	16.820,93	10.176,32	1.422,80	2.659,48	605,98	3.439,49	4.426,17

Source : *Rapport van de resident van Djokdjakarta (C.Canne) aan de Directeur van landbouw, nijverheid en handel (J.Sibinga Mulder). 12 Febr. 1919. mr 164g/19. Vb 13-6-19-93. B. 1974:286-187*

Table 9: Maximum Selling Price (florin per pikul) of the Government food in Jogjakarta (fixed at 30 January 1919)

Afdeeling	Yogyakarta Kulon Progo	Gunung Kidul	Yogyakarta City
I. Java rice	16	16.50	16
II. Sioka	13.50	14.00	13.00
III. Gardenrice II*	16.50	17.00	16.00
IV. Menir A I*	15.50	16.00	15.00
V. Menir C I *	14.75	15.25	14.25
VI. Menir C III*	13.50	14.00	13.00
VII. Supermeel **	9.50	10.00	9.00
VIII. K.K.K. II ^a	6.15	6.75	5.75
IX. K.K. Meal	4.55	5.15	4.15
X. Soybean	13.75	14.25	13.25
XI. Sago	8.20	8.80	7.80
XII. Gaplek	5.60	6.00	5.20
XIII. Ampas Gaplek	3.90	4.30	3.50

Note: * import rice

** tapioca made by the people.

and + made from cassava

Source: *Rapport van de resident van Djokdjakarta (C.Cane) aan de direktur van landbouw, nijverheid en handel (J. Sibinga Mulder). 12 feb. 1919. Afschrift. Mr 164g/19. Vb 13-6-19-93. Het Economisch Beleid in Nederlands-Indie, 2e stuk, 1974: 280-281*

**Table 10: Government Food supplied to Surabaya
before the establishment of Controller for Food Distribution**

	Amount (<i>pikul</i>)	Value (florin)
Rice	81.173	1.132,968
Soybean	11.001	137,507
Sago	1.252	7,513
Ampas	2.584	7,005
Gaplek	2.455	10,586
Total		1.295,579

Source: *Rapport Verhoog* 1921

Table 11: Revenue and expenditure of the food distribution in Surabaya

		Amount (<i>pikul</i>)	Value (florin)
Expenditure	Foreign rice (Akijab Saigon)	384.264,13	6.255,926,96
	Domestic & confiscated rice	327.533,53	5.519,566,83
	Maize (from Java & Celebes)	88.154,21	629.264,94
	Gaplek	1.513,00	6.808,50
	Wheat flour	40,00	520,00
	Total		12.412,087,23
Revenue	Foreign rice (Akijab Saigon)	383.682,27	6.368,960,18
	Domestic & confiscated rice	323.852,52	5.805,243,31
	Maize (from Java & Celebes)	88.740,90	617.547,08
	Gaplek	1.512,33	6.049,32
	Wheat flour	40,00	46,80
	Total		12.797,846,69
Balance	Foreign rice (Akijab Saigon)		+ 113,033,22
	Domestic & confiscated rice		+ 285.676,48
	Maize (from Java & Celebes)		- 11.717,86
	Gaplek		- 759,18
	Wheat flour		- 473,20
	Total		+ 385,759,46

Table 12: Paddy Purchase in Besuki in 1919 (*pikul*)

Afdeeling	Planned amount	Actual purchase in March 1920	Remaining amount in March 1920
Jember	200,000	less than 90,000	ca. 80,000
Banyuwangi	50,000	26,400	ca. 26,400
Panarukan	20,000	ca.	ca. 6,100
Bondowoso	30,000	23,600	ca. 6,000
Total	300,000	ca. 140,000	ca. 118,500

Source : Vries, 1920

**Table 13: Actual delivery of the rice mills
in Besuki at the beginning of March (*pikul*)**

Afdeeling	Delivery contracted in December	Actual Delivery at the beginning of March
Bondowoso	2,000	2,000
Jember	24,000	ca.20,000
Banyuwangi	36,000	ca.33,000
Total	62,000	55,000

Source: Vries, 1920

Table 14: Actual purchase of paddy in Surabaya

Afdeeling	purchase in 1919		purchase in 1920	
	amount (<i>pikul</i>)	value (florin)	amount (<i>pikul</i>)	value (florin)
Surabaya	21.478,46	116.042,48	26.459,48	163.710,815
Sidoarjo	73.902,01	337.887,86	95.134,89	613.335,855
i.d. (rice)				27.042,37
Mojokerto	150.362,36	789.311,80	104.100,65	659.619,795
Jombang	164.825,54	870.203,175	158.687,39	1.003.880,38
Lamongan	80.010,77	390.017,115	106.960,59	623.063,56
Gresik	24.642,92	128.553,72	29.514,45	178.206,42
Total	515.222,06	2.668.016,155	520.857,45	3.268.859,195

Source: *Rapport Verhoog*

Table 15: Paddy price in 1920

	Jan.	Feb.	March	April	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.
Banten	7.09	6.71	6.86	6.96	6.74	6.54	6.47	6.50	6.57	6.80	6.91	7.09
Batavia	4.56	4.59	6.52	6.15	6.13	6.02	6.15	6.15	6.27	6.35	6.32	6.52
Priangan	5.95	6.31	6.40	6.42	6.84	6.10	6.13	6.30	6.45	6.43	6.72	7.04
Cirebon	9.25	8.64	7.57	7.09	6.40	6.35	6.68	6.59	6.76	7.35	7.68	7.51
Pekalongan	6.40	6.42	6.13	6.13	6.04	6.06	6.06	6.18	6.22	6.63	7.41	7.27
Semarang	7.54	7.79	7.98	7.23	7.28	6.50	7.23	7.66	7.79	8.74	7.98	8.09
Rembang	6.33	7.21	7.14	6.74	6.63	n.a.	6.50	6.43	6.33	6.33	6.33	7.52
Banyumas	6.30	6.36	6.04	6.02	6.16	5.96	6.24	6.29	6.22	6.48	7.22	7.32
Kedu	8.93	8.02	7.34	7.30	7.32	7.26	7.60	7.79	8.02	8.30	9.03	8.91
Yogyakarta	9.00	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	7.25
Solo	7.65	7.80	7.40	6.90	6.49	6.51	6.68	7.24	8.03	9.02	9.07	10.05
Madiun	6.22	6.36	6.58	6.73	6.57	5.90	6.14	6.33	6.60	7.15	7.08	7.37
Surabaya	9.27	9.41	n.a.	n.a.	7.06	7.63	8.27	6.87	6.78	6.86	7.72	8.12
Madura	12.97	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	12.97	13.61	13.46	14.52	16.07	16.04	15.13	17.25
Kediri	7.27	7.41	7.92	6.94	6.54	6.79	6.86	7.43	7.75	8.29	8.85	7.85
Pasuruan	6.35	6.32	7.39	6.96	6.80	6.47	6.49	6.48	6.50	8.02	7.81	7.63
Besuki	4.66	4.83	5.67	6.39	6.39	6.42	6.47	6.47	6.47	6.47	6.42	6.32
Average	7.35	7.05	6.98	5.27	6.75	6.68	6.82	6.90	7.05	7.43	7.65	7.67

Source: *Terslag aanplant en oogst*, Jan. 1920, nr 339g/20; Febr. 1920, nr 463g/20; Maart 1920, nr 685g/20; April 1920, nr 685g/20; Mei 1920, nr 709g/20; Juni 1920, nr 868g/20; Juli 1920, nr 983g/20; Aug. 1920, nr 1116g/20; Sept. 1920, nr 1204g/20; Oct. 1920, nr 1294g/20; No. 1920, nr 23g/21; Dec. 1920, nr 169g/21 (in Verbaal 12 April 1921 no. 16)

Government Rice Flow in Java and Madura

